Navigation

Filosofi: metafysik og ontologi

Properties, Powers and Structures

Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism

Udgivet af Taylor & Francis Ltd

Bogdetaljer

  • Hæftet
  • 280 sider
  • Engelsk
ISBN 9781138245280
Om denne bog

While the phrase "metaphysics of science" has been used from time to time, it has only recently begun to denote a specific research area where metaphysics meets philosophy of scienceand the sciences themselves. The essays in this volume demonstrate that metaphysics of science is an innovative field of research in its o…

Se alle bogdetaljer →
Prissammenligning

Ingen boghandelspriser listet endnu

Denne titel er i vores bogkatalog. Butikstilbud vises her, når de er tilgængelige.

Betroet sælger:

Ingen boghandelstilbud lige nu.

Søg efter ISBN
Opdateret i dag

Boghandelspriser

Boghandel Titel Format ISBN Pris Lagerstatus Levering

Ingen boghandelstilbud endnu

Vi har titlen i kataloget. Priser vises her, når boghandlere lister den.

0.0
0 anmeldelser
5
0
4
0
3
0
2
0
1
0
0%
Anbefaler
0
Verificeret
Alle anmeldelser (0)

Ingen anmeldelser endnu

Skriv en anmeldelse

Valgfri - Kun brugt til verifikation
0 / 5000 tegn
Bogdetaljer
Forlag Taylor & Francis Ltd
Kategori Filosofi: metafysik og ontologi
ISBN-13 9781138245280
EAN 9781138245280
Format Hæftet
Sprog Engelsk
sider 280
Undertitel - Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism
Produktbeskrivelse
While the phrase "metaphysics of science" has been used from time to time, it has only recently begun to denote a specific research area where metaphysics meets philosophy of scienceand the sciences themselves. The essays in this volume demonstrate that metaphysics of science is an innovative field of research in its own right. The principle areas covered are: The modal metaphysics of properties: What is the essential nature of natural properties? Are all properties essentially categorical? Are they all essentially dispositions, or are some categorical and others dispositional? Realism in mathematics and its relation to science: What does a naturalistic commitment of scientific realism tell us about our commitments to mathematical entities? Can this question be framed in something other than a Quinean philosophy? Dispositions and their relation to causation: Can we generate an account of causation that takes dispositionality as fundamental? And if we take dispositions as fundamental (and hence not having a categorical causal basis), what is the ontological ground of dispositions? Pandispositionalism: Could all properties be dispositional in nature? Natural kinds: Are there natural kinds, and if so what account of their nature should we give? For example, do they have essences? Here we consider how these issues may be illuminated by considering examples from reals science, in particular biochemistry and neurobiology.

Prishistorik

Indlæser prishistorik...

Få prisalarm

Bliv underrettet, når prisen falder til dit ønskede beløb.